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ABSTRACT
Permissionless blockchains allow the execution of arbitrary pro-
grams (called smart contracts), enabling mutually untrusted entities
to interact without relying on trusted third parties. Despite their
potential, repeated security concerns have shaken the trust in han-
dling billions of USD by smart contracts.
To address this problem, we present Securify, a security ana-
lyzer for Ethereum smart contracts that is scalable, fully automated,
and able to prove contract behaviors as safe/unsafe with respect to
a given property. Securify’s analysis consists of two steps. First, it
symbolically analyzes the contract’s dependency graph to extract
precise semantic information from the code. Then, it checks com-
pliance and violation patterns that capture sufficient conditions
for proving if a property holds or not. To enable extensibility, all
patterns are specified in a designated domain-specific language.
Securify is publicly released, it has analyzed > 18K contracts
submitted by its users, and is regularly used to conduct security
audits by experts. We present an extensive evaluation of Securify
over real-world Ethereum smart contracts and demonstrate that it
can effectively prove the correctness of smart contracts and discover
critical violations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain platforms, such as Nakamoto’s Bitcoin [43], enable the
trade of crypto-currencies between mutually mistrusting parties.
To eliminate the need for trust, Nakomoto designed a peer-to-peer
network that enables its peers to agree on the trading transactions.
Buterin [24] identified the applicability of decentralized computa-
tion beyond trading, and designed the Ethereum blockchain which
supports the execution of programs, called smart contracts, written
in Turing-complete languages. Smart contracts have shown to be
applicable in many domains including financial industry [8], public
sector [11] and cross-industry [9].
The increased adoption of smart contracts demands strong se-
curity guarantees. Unfortunately, it is challenging to create smart
contracts that are free of security bugs. As a consequence, critical
vulnerabilities in smart contracts are discovered and exploited ev-
ery few months [2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 26]. In turn, these exploits have led to
losses reaching millions worth of USD in the past few years: 150M
were stolen from the popular DAO contract in June 2016 [6], 30M
were stolen from the widely-used Parity multi-signature wallet in
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July 2017 [10], and few months later 280Mwere frozen due to a bug
in the very same wallet [13]. It is apparent that effective security
checkers for smart contracts are urgently needed.
KeyChallenges. Themain challenge in creating an effective secu-
rity analyzer for smart contracts is the Turing-completeness of the
programming language, which renders automated verification of
arbitrary properties undecidable. To address this issue, current auto-
mated solutions tend to rely on fairly generic testing and symbolic
execution methods (e.g., Oyente [39] and Mythril [16]). While use-
ful in some settings, these approaches come with several drawbacks:
(i) they can miss critical violations (due to under-approximation),
(ii) yet, can also produce false positives (due to imprecise modeling
of domain-specific elements [30]), and (iii) they can fail to achieve
sufficient code coverage on realistic contracts (Oyente achieves
only 20.2% coverage on the popular Parity wallet [17]). Overall,
these drawbacks place a significant burden on their users, whomust
inspect all reports for false alarms and worry about unreported vul-
nerabilities. Indeed, many security properties for smart contracts
are inherently difficult to reason about directly. A viable path to
addressing these challenges is building an automated verifier that
targets important domain-specific properties [15]. For example, re-
cent work [31] focuses solely on identifying reentrancy issues in
smart contracts [5].
Domain-Specific Insight. A key observation of this work is that
it is often possible to devise precise patterns expressed on the
contract’s data-flow graph in a way where a match of the pattern
implies either a violation or satisfaction of the original security
property. For example, 90.9% of all calls in Ethereum smart contracts
can be proved free of the infamous DAO bug [6] by matching a
pattern stating that calls are not followed by writes to storage.
The reason why it is possible to establish such a correspondence
is that violations of the original property in real-world contracts
tend to often violate a much simpler property (captured by the
pattern). Indeed, in terms of verification, a key benefit in working
with patterns, instead of with their corresponding property, is that
patterns are substantially more amenable to automated reasoning.
Securify: Domain-specific Verifier. Based on the above in-
sight, we developed Securify, a lightweight and scalable security
verifier for Ethereum smart contracts. The key technical idea is to
define two kinds of patterns that mirror a given security property:
(i) compliance patterns, which imply the satisfaction of the property,
and (ii) violation patterns, which imply its negation. To check these
patterns, Securify symbolically encodes the dependence graph of
the contract in stratified Datalog [50] and leverages off-the-shelf
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00:60
01:07
02:5b
03:56
04:10
...
MemTag(0x20,Const)
MemVal(0x40,Caller)
Eq(x, MLoad(0x40))
SStore(02, Gas, y)
Call(04, x, y)
...
exists Call(_, _, y)
  !MayDep(y,Gas) 
all SStore(_, x, _)
  DetBy(x,Caller)
...
Figure 1: Securify’s approach is based on automatic infer-
ence of semantic program facts followed by checking of
compliance and violation security patterns over these facts.
scalable Datalog solvers to efficiently (typically within seconds)
analyze the code. To ensure extensibility, all patterns are expressed
in a designated domain-specific language (DSL).
In Fig. 1, we illustrate the analysis flow of Securify. Starting
with the contract’s bytecode (or source code, which can be compiled
to bytecode), Securify derives semantic facts inferred by analyzing
the contract’s dependency graph and uses these facts to check a set
of compliance and violation patterns. Based on the outcome of these
checks, Securify classifies all contract behaviors into violations (_),
warnings (▲), and compliant (■), as abstractly illustrated in Fig. 2.
Here, the large box depicts all contract behaviors, partitioned into
safe (which satisfy the property) and unsafe ones (which violate
it). Securify reports as violations (_) all behaviors matching the
violation pattern, and as warnings (▲) all remaining behaviors not
matched by the compliance pattern.
Reduced Manual Effort. Compared to existing symbolic ana-
lyzers for smart contracts, Securify reduces the required effort to
inspect reports in two ways. First, existing analyzers do not report
definite violations (they conflate _ and ▲), and thus require users
to manually classify all reported vulnerabilities into true positives
(found in the red box ) or false positives (found in the green box ).
In contrast, Securify automatically classifies behaviors guaranteed
to be violations (marked with _). Hence, the user only needs to
manually classify the warnings (▲) as true or false positives.
As we show in our evaluation, the approach of using both viola-
tion and compliance patterns reduces the warnings a user needs
to inspect manually by 65.9%, and even up to 99.4% for some prop-
erties. Second, existing analyzers fail to report unsafe behaviors
(sometimes up to 72.9%), meaning users may have to manually
inspect portions of the code that are not covered by the analyzer.
In contrast, Securify reports all unsafe behaviors.
Auditing Smart Contracts. Securify is publicly available at
https://securify.ch and has analyzed > 18K contracts submitted
by its users. Over the last year, we have also extensively used Secu-
rify to perform 38 detailed commercial audits of smart contracts
(other auditors have also used Securify), iteratively improving the
approach and adding more patterns. Indeed, the design and imple-
mentation of Securify have greatly benefited from this experience.
In terms of the actual audit process, our approach (and we believe
that of other auditors) has been to run all available tools and then
to manually inspect the reported vulnerabilities so to assess their
severity. For instance, while Securify covers a number of impor-
tant properties (the full version supports 18 properties), symbolic
unsafe behaviors safe behaviors
violation
pattern
compliance
pattern
warning
violation
no violation
all behaviors
Figure 2: Securify uses compliance and violation patterns
to guarantee that certain behaviors are safe and, respec-
tively, unsafe. The remaining behaviors are reported as
warnings (to avoid missing errors).
execution tools have better support for numerical properties (e.g.,
overflow). Our finding was that Securify was particularly help-
ful in auditing larger contracts, which are challenging to inspect
with existing solutions for the reasons listed earlier. Overall, we
believe Securify is a pragmatic and valuable point in the space of
analyzing smart contracts due to its careful balance of scalability,
guarantees, and precision.
Main Contributions. To summarize, our main contributions are:
– A decompiler that symbolically encodes the dependency
graph of Ethereum contracts in Datalog (Section 4).
– A set of compliance and violation security patterns that
capture sufficient conditions to prove and disprove practical
security properties (Section 5).
– An end-to-end implementation, called Securify, which fully
automates the analysis of contracts (Section 6).
– An extensive evaluation over existing Ethereum smart con-
tracts showing that Securify can effectively prove the cor-
rectness of contracts and discover violations (Section 7).
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
In this section, we motivate the problem we address through two
real-world security issues that affected ≈ 200millions worth of USD
in 2017. We describe the underlying security properties and the
challenges involved in proving whether a contract satisfies/violates
them. We also describe how Securify discovers both vulnerabilities
with appropriate violation patterns.
2.1 Stealing Ether
In Fig. 3, we show an implementation of a wallet. The code is written
in Solidity [18], a popular high-level language for writing Ethereum
smart contracts. We remark that this wallet is a simplified version
of Parity’s multi-signature wallet, which allowed an attacker to
steal 30 million worth of USD in July 2017.
The wallet has a field owner, which stores the address of the
wallet’s owner. Further, the contract has a function initWallet,
which takes as argument an address _owner and initializes the field
owner with it. This function is called by the constructor (not shown
in Fig. 3), and was assumed not to be accessible otherwise [10].
Finally, the contract has a function withdraw, which takes as ar-
gument an unsigned integer _amount. The function checks if the
transaction sender’s address (returned by msg.sender) equals that
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 contract OwnableWallet {
   address owner;
 
   // called by the constructor
   function initWallet(address _owner) {
     owner = _owner; // any user can change owner
     // more setup 
   }
 
   // function that allows the owner to withdraw ether
   function withdraw(uint _amount) {
     if (msg.sender == owner) {
       owner.transfer(_amount);
     } 
   }
   // ...
 }
Figure 3: A vulnerable wallet that allows any user to with-
draw all ether stored in it.
of the contract’s owner (stored in the field owner). If this check suc-
ceeds, it transfers _amount ether to the owner with the statement
owner.transfer(_amount); otherwise, no ether is transferred. The
withdraw function ensures that only the owner can withdraw ether
from the wallet.
Attack. The wallet shown in Fig. 3 has a critical security flaw:
any user could actually call the initWallet function and store an
arbitrary address in the field owner. An attacker can, therefore, steal
all ether stored in the wallet in two steps. First, the attacker calls the
function initWallet, passing her own address as argument. Second,
the attacker calls the function withdraw, passing as argument the
amount of ether stored in the wallet. We remark that in the attack
on Parity’s wallet, to perform the first step the attacker exploits a
fallback mechanism to call the initWallet function; we omit these
details for simplicity and refer the reader to [10] for details on the
actual attack.
Security Property. The underlying security problem that allowed
the attacker to steal ether is that the security-critical field owner
is universally writable by any Ethereum user. This security issue
mirrors a more general property stipulating that the write to the
owner field is restricted, in the sense that not all users can make
a transaction that writes to this field. To show that this property
is satisfied, we need to demonstrate that some user cannot send
a transaction that modifies the owner field. Conversely, to show a
violation, we need to prove that all users can send a transaction that
modifies the owner field. Proving both satisfaction and demonstrat-
ing violations of this property is nontrivial due to the enormous
space of possible users and transactions that they can make.
Detection. To discover this security issue, Securify provides a
violation pattern that is matched if the execution of the assignment
owner = _owner, highlighted in red in Fig. 3, does not depend
on the value returned by the caller instruction (which returns the
address of the transaction sender). To check this pattern, Securify
infers data- and control-flow dependencies by analyzing the con-
tract’s dependency graph; cf. [35]. Here, Securify infers that the
contract Wallet {
  // fixed address of the wallet library
  address constant walletLibrary = ...;
  // function that receives ether
  function deposit() payable {
    log(msg.sender, msg.value);
  }
  
  // function for withdrawing ether
  function withdraw() {
    walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
  }
  
  // ...
} // No guaranteed ether transfer 
Figure 4: A wallet that delegates functionality to a library
contract walletLibrary.
assignment owner = _owner does not depend on the caller instruc-
tion, which implies that the assignment is reachable by any user.
In Section 3, we provide more details on this violation pattern and
further details on how Securify uses it to detect the vulnerability.
We remark that some symbolic checkers perform imprecise
checks of similar properties, which result in both false positives and
false negatives. For instance, as we show in Fig. 13 of our evaluation
later, Mythril [16] has about 65% false negatives when checking a
similar property stipulating that not all users may trigger a particu-
lar ether transfer.
2.2 Frozen Funds
In Fig. 4, we show a wallet implementation which suffers from a
security issue that froze millions worth of USD in November 2017.
This wallet has a field, walletLibrary, which stores the address of a
contract implementing common wallet functionality. Further, it has
a function deposit, marked as payable, which means users can send
ether to the contract by calling this function. The function deposit
logs the amount of ether (identified by msg.value) sent by the trans-
action sender (identified by msg.sender). Finally, the contract has
a function withdraw, which delegates all calls to the wallet library.
That is, the statement walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data)
results in executing the withdraw method of the wallet library in
the context of the current wallet.
Attack. Ethereum contracts can be removed from the blockchain
using a designated kill instruction. If an attacker can remove the
wallet library from the blockchain, then the funds in the wallet
cannot be extracted from the wallet. This is because the wallet
relies on the library smart contract to withdraw ether. In November
2017, a popular wallet library was removed from the blockchain,
effectively freezing ≈ 280 million worth of USD [7].
Security Property. The underlying security problem with this
wallet is that it allows users to deposit ether, but it cannot guarantee
that the ether can be transferred out of the contract, since the
transfer depends on a library. To discover that the wallet has this
problem, we must prove two facts: (i) users can deposit ether and
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EVM code
Matched pattern
00: 60 04
02: 35 60
04: 08 56
06: 5B 00
08: 5B 60
0A: 00 56
0C: 60 00
0E: 55 56
// entry
L1 a = 0x04
L2 b = dataload(a)
L3 ABI_9DA8(b)
L4 stop()
// method
   ABI_9DA8(b) {
L5  c = 0x00
    // write owner
L6  sstore(c, b);
   }
00: push 0x04
02: dataload
03: push 08
05: jump
06: jumpdest
07: stop
08: jumpdest
09: push 0x00
0B: sload
0C: push 0x00
0E: sstore
0F: jump
... !MayDepOn(c, Caller) 
&& !MayDepOn(6, Caller)
Restricted write 
violation pattern
MustFollow(L2, L1)
VarTag(a, const)
MayDepOn(b, dataload)  
Eq(c, 0x00)
Parsed code Decompiled code
Semantic facts
...
// entry
L1 a = 0x04
L2 b = dataload(a)
L3 ABI_9DA8(b)
L4 stop()
// method
   ABI_9DA8(b) {
L5  c = 0x00
    // write owner
L6  sstore(c, b);
   }
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 5: High-level flow illustrating how Securify finds the unrestricted write to the owner field of the contract from Fig. 3.
The input (EVM bytecode and security patterns) is highlighted in green , the output (in our example, a violated instruction)
is highlighted in red , and gray boxes represent intermediate analysis artifacts. Securify proceeds in three steps: (1) it
decompiles the contract’s EVM bytecode into a static-single assignment form, (2) it infers semantics facts about the contract,
and (3) it matches the violation pattern of the restricted write property on the sstore instruction that writes to the owner field.
(ii) the contract has no ether transfer instructions (i.e., call) with
non-zero amount of ether. Note that if the contract only transfers
out ether through libraries, the second requirement is met.
Detection. To discover this vulnerability, Securify’s violation
pattern checks the conjunction of two facts. First, to prove that
users can deposit ether, Securify checks whether there is a stop in-
struction whose execution does not depend on the ether transferred
being zero. Assuming that the stop instruction is reachable for some
transaction, this implies that a user can reach it with a positive ether
amount, resulting in a deposit of ether to the contract. Second, Se-
curify checks whether for all call instructions, the amount of ether
extracted from the contract is zero. The conjunction of these two
facts implies that ether can be locked in the contract.
3 THE SECURIFY SYSTEM
In the previous section, we illustrated that while security issues in
smart contracts are complex, they can be often captured with se-
mantic facts inferred from the code. In this section, we describe the
Securify system, which builds on this idea to prove and disprove
security properties of smart contracts. We accompany this section
with the example of how Securify detects the unrestricted write
to the owner field in the wallet contract (Fig. 3). Fig. 5 summarizes
the main steps.
Inputs to Securify. The input to Securify is the EVM bytecode
of a contract and a set of security patterns, specified in our desig-
nated domain-specific language (DSL). Securify can also take as
input contracts written in Solidity (not shown in Fig. 5), which are
compiled to EVM bytecode before proceeding with the analysis.
There are two kinds of security patterns: compliance and violation
patterns, which capture sufficient conditions to ensure that a con-
tract satisfies and, respectively, violates a given security property.
Fig. 5 illustrates the input to Securify in green boxes, which
show part of the EVM bytecode of the wallet contract (only the part
necessary to illustrate the vulnerability) and the violation pattern
of the restricted write property. Intuitively, the pattern is matched
if there is a write that is not restricted.
To discover the unrestricted write in the contract, Securify
proceeds with the following three steps.
Step 1: Decompiling EVM Bytecode. Securify first transforms
the EVM bytecode provided as input into a stackless representation
in static-single assignment form (SSA). For example, in Fig. 5, for the
stack expression push 0x04, Securify introduces a local variable
a and an assignment statement a = 4. In addition to removing
the stack, Securify identifies methods. For example, the method
ABI_9DA8, shown in Fig. 5, corresponds to the initOwnermethod of
the wallet contract, shown in Fig. 3. After decompilation, Securify
performs partial evaluation to resolve memory and storage offsets,
jump destinations, all of which are important for precisely analyzing
the code statically. We describe these optimizations in Section 6.
Step 2: Inferring Semantic Facts. After decompilation, Secu-
rify analyzes the contract to infer semantic facts, including data-
and control-flow dependencies, which hold over all behaviors of
the contract. For example, the fact MayDepOn(b, dataload), shown
in Fig. 5, captures that the value of variable b may depend on the
value returned by the instruction dataload. Further, the fact Eq(c, 0)
captures that variable c equals the constant 0.
Securify’s derivation of semantic facts is specified declaratively
in stratified Datalog and is fully automated using existing scalable
engines [36]. Key benefits of the declarative approach are: (i) in-
ference rules concisely capture abstract reasoning about different
components (e.g., contract storage), (ii) more facts and inference
rules can be easily added, and (iii) inference rules are specified in a
modular way (e.g., memory analysis is specified independently of
contract storage analysis). We list the semantic facts that Securify
derives, along with the inference rules, in Section 4.
Step 3: Checking Security Patterns. After obtaining the seman-
tics facts, Securify checks the set of compliance and violation
security patterns, given as input. These patterns are written in a
specialized domain-specific language (DSL), which enables secu-
rity experts to extend our built-in set of patterns with their cus-
tomized patterns. Our DSL is a fragment of logical formulas over
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the semantic facts inferred by Securify. To detect the vulnerability
in the contract of Fig. 3, Securify matches the violation pattern
(given as input) on the sstore(c, b) instruction at label l6 in Fig. 5.
In sstore(c, b), c is the storage offset of the owner field, and b is the
value to store. The violation pattern matches if there exists some
sstore instruction for which both the storage offset, denoted X ,
and the execution of this instruction, identified by its label L, do
not depend on the result of the caller instruction in any possible
execution of the contract. Since the instruction caller retrieves the
address of the transaction sender, matching this pattern implies
that any user can reach this sstore and change the value of owner.
In our DSL, where negation is encoded by ¬ and conjunction by ∧,
this pattern is encoded as:
some sstore(L,X , _).¬MayDepOn(X , caller)∧¬MayDepOn(L, caller)
Securify’s DSL is important for extensibility: adding new secu-
rity patterns amounts to specifying them in this DSL. To illustrate
the expressiveness of the DSL, in Section 5, we present a range of
security patterns for important properties, such as restricted writes,
exception handling, ether liquidity, input validation, and others.
We remark that contract-specific patterns are sometimes added
by security experts while conducting security audits. For exam-
ple, it is often required to check for the absence of undesirable
dependencies, such as: only the owner can modify certain values
in the storage, or to ensure that the result of a specific arithmetic
expression does not depend on the division instruction (which may
cause undesirable integer rounding effects). We illustrate how such
contract-specific patterns are specified in the DSL in Section 5.
Output of Securify. For any match of a violation pattern, Secu-
rify outputs the instruction that caused the pattern to match. In our
example, it highlights the instruction sstore(c, b). We remark that
the offset of this instruction can be easily mapped to its correspond-
ing line in the Solidity code, if the source code is provided. Further,
for any property for which neither the violation nor the compliance
pattern is matched, Securify outputs a warning, indicating that it
failed to prove or disprove the property.
Limitations. We briefly summarize several limitations of Secu-
rify. First, the current version of Securify cannot reason about
numerical properties, such as overflows. To address this limitation,
we plan to extend Securify with numerical analysis (e.g., using
ELINA [48]), which would not only improve the precision of Secu-
rify but also enable the checking of numerical properties.
Second, Securify does not reason about reachability, and as-
sumes that all instructions in the contract are reachable. This as-
sumption is necessary to establish a formal correspondence between
the security properties supported by Securify and the patterns
used to prove and disprove them. For instance, in our example,
Securify assumes that the matched sstore instruction is reachable
by some execution (otherwise, there is no violation).
Finally, the properties we consider capture violations that can of-
ten, but not always, be exploited by attackers. For example, there are
fields in the contract that must be universally writable by all users.
To address this, security experts can write contract-specific patterns
in Securify’s DSL (e.g., to specify which fields are sensitive).
4 SEMANTIC FACTS
In this section, we present the automated inference of control- and
data-flow dependencies that Securify employs. The facts inferred
in this process are called semantic facts and are later used for check-
ing security properties. We begin with the background necessary
for understanding this analysis: the EVM instruction set and strat-
ified Datalog. We then introduce the semantic facts derived by
Securify and the declarative inference rules, specified in stratified
Datalog, used to derive them.
4.1 Background
In this section, we provide the necessary background.
4.1.1 Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Smart contracts are exe-
cuted on a blockchain. A contract executes when a user submits a
transaction that specifies the contract, the method to run, and the
method’s arguments (if any). When the transaction is processed,
it is added to a new block, which is appended to the blockchain.
Contracts can access a volatile memory and non-volatile storage.
The EVM instruction set (over which contracts are written) sup-
ports a few dozen opcodes. Securify handles all EVM opcodes;
we present the most relevant ones below. Note that many of the
opcodes (such as push, dup, etc.) are eliminated when Securify
decompiles the EVM bytecode to its stackless representation. The
relevant instructions are:
– Arithmetic operations and comparisons: e.g., add, mul, lt, eq.
In the rest of the paper, we write op to denote any of these
operations.
– Cryptographic hash functions: e.g., sha3.
– Environmental information: e.g., balance returns the balance
of a contract, caller is the identity of the transaction sender,
callvalue is the amount of ether specified to be transferred
by the transaction.
– Block information: e.g., number, timestamp, gaslimit.
– Memory and storage operations: mload, mstore, sstore, sload
load/store data from the memory/contract storage.
– System operations: e.g., call, which transfers ether, and takes
two arguments: receiver address and amount of ether to
transfer (in fact, call takes seven arguments; we consider
here only those that are relevant for the rest of the paper).
– Control-flow instructions: e.g., goto, which encodes condi-
tional jumps across instructions.
For the complete set of instructions, along with their formal
description, we refer the reader to [52].
4.1.2 Stratified Datalog. Stratified Datalog is a declarative logic
language, which enables to write facts (predicates) and rules to infer
facts. We next briefly overview its syntax and semantics.
Syntax. We present Datalog’s syntax in Fig. 6. A Datalog program
consists of one or more rules, denoted r . A rule r consists of a
head a, and a body, l , consisting of literals, separated by commas.
The head, also called an atom, is a predicate over zero or more
terms, denoted t , comma-separated. A literal l is a predicate or its
negation. As a convention, we write Datalog variables in upper case
and constants in lower case. A Datalog program is well-formed if
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(Program) P ::= r (Predicates) p,q ∈ P
(Rule) r ::= a ⇐ l (Term) t ∈ V ∪ C
(Atom) a ::= p(t) (Datalog variables) X ,Y ∈ V
(Literal) l ::= a | ¬a (Constants) x ,y ∈ C
Figure 6: Syntax of stratified Datalog.
for any rule a ⇐ l , we have vars(a) ⊆ vars(l), where vars(l) returns
the set of variables in l .
A Datalog program P is stratified if its rules can be partitioned
into strata P1, . . . , Pn such that if a predicate p occurs in a positive
(negative) literal in the body of a rule in Pi , then all rules with p
in their heads are in a stratum Pj with j ≤ i (j < i). Stratification
ensures that predicates that appear in negative literals are fully
defined in lower strata.
Semantics. Let A = {p(t) | t ⊆ C} (where t is a list of terms
separated by commas) denote the set of all ground (i.e., variable-
free) atoms; we refer to these as facts. An interpretation A ⊆ A is
a set of facts. The complete lattice (P(A), ⊆,∩,∪, ∅,A) partially
orders the set of interpretations P(A).
Given a substitution σ ∈ V → C, mapping variables to con-
stants, and an atom a, we write σ (a) for the fact obtained by re-
placing the variables in a according to σ . For example, σ (p(X ))
returns the fact p(σ (X )). Given a program P , its consequence oper-
ator TP ∈ P(A) → P(A) is defined as:
TP (A) = {σ (a) | (a ⇐ l1 . . . ln ) ∈ P ,∀li ∈ l . A ⊢ σ (li )}
where A ⊢ σ (a) if σ (a) ∈ A and A ⊢ σ (¬a) if σ (a) < A.
An input for P is a set of facts constructed using P ’s extensional
predicates, i.e., those that appear only in the rule bodies. Let P be a
program with strata P1, . . . , Pn and I be an input for P . The model
of P for I , denoted by [[P]]I , isMn , whereM0 = I andMi = ⋂{A ∈
fp TPi | Mi−1 ⊆ A} is the smallest fixed point of TPi that is greater
than or equal to the lower stratum’s modelMi−1.
4.2 Facts and Inference Rules
Securify first extracts a set of base facts that hold for every in-
struction. These base facts constitute a Datalog input that is fed
to a Datalog program to infer additional facts about the contract.
We use the term semantic facts to refer to the facts derived by the
Datalog program. All program elements that appear in the contract,
including instruction labels, variables, fields, string and integer
constants, are represented as constants in the Datalog program.
Base Facts. The base facts of our inference engine describe the
instructions in the contract’s control-flow graph (CFG). The base
facts take the form of instr(L,Y ,X1, . . . ,Xn ), where instr is the in-
struction name, L is the instruction’s label, Y is the variable storing
the instruction result (if any), and X1, . . . ,Xn are variables given to
the instruction as arguments (if any). For example, the instruction
l1: a = 4 (from Fig. 5) is encoded to assign(l1, a, 4). Further, the in-
struction l6: sstore(c, b), where the variable c is known to be equal
to the constant 0 at compile time, is encoded to sstore(l6, 0, b); if
the value of the variable c could not be determined at compile time,
then the instruction would be encoded to sstore(l6,⊤, b), where ⊤
is a Datalog constant that encodes that the value of c is unknown.
Semantic fact Intuitive meaning
Flow Dependencies
MayFollow(L1, L2) Instruction at label L2 may follow that at label L1.
MustFollow(L1, L2) Instruction at label L2 must follow that at label L1.
Data Dependencies
MayDepOn(Y , T ) The value of Y may depend on tag T .
Eq(Y , T ) The values of Y and T are equal.
DetBy(Y , T ) For different values of T the value of Y is different.
Figure 7: The semantic facts: L1 and L2 are labels, Y is a vari-
able, and T is a tag (a variable or a label).
The base facts of consecutive instructions are expressed by a predi-
cate defined over labels called Follow. For every two labels, L1 and
L2, whose instructions are consecutive in the CFG (either in the
same basic block or in linked basic blocks), we have the base fact
Follow(L1,L2). An example, Follow fact derived for the contract,
shown in Fig 5, is Follow(l1, l2). The join of then/else branches is
captured by a predicate Join(L1,L2), which encodes that the two
branches that originate at an instruction goto(L1,X ,L3), located
at label L1, are joined (i.e., they are merged into a single path) at
label L2. Using the base facts described above, Securify computes
two kinds of semantic facts: (i) flow-dependency predicates, which
capture instruction dependencies according to the contract’s CFG,
and (ii) data-dependency predicates; see Fig. 7.
Flow-Dependency Predicates. The flow predicates we consider
areMayFollow andMustFollow, both are defined over pairs of labels
and are inferred from the contract’s CFG. The intuitive meaning
(also summarized in Fig. 7) is:
– MayFollow(L1,L2) holds for L1 and L2 if both are in the same
basic block and L2 follows L1, or there is a path from the
basic block of L1 to the basic block of L2.
– MustFollow(L1,L2) holds if both are in the same basic block
and L2 follows L1, or any path to the basic block of L2 passes
through the basic block of L1.
To infer the MayFollow and MustFollow predicates, we use the
Follow(L1,L2) input fact which holds if L2 immediately follows L1
in the CFG. Namely, the predicate MayFollow is defined with the
following two Datalog rules:
MayFollow(L1,L2) ⇐ Follow(L1,L2)
MayFollow(L1,L2) ⇐ MayFollow(L1,L3), Follow(L3,L2)
The first rule is interpreted as: if Follow(L1,L2) holds (i.e., it is con-
tained in the Datalog input), then the predicate MayFollow(L1,L2)
is derived (i.e., it is added to the fixed-point). The second rule is
interpreted as: if both MayFollow(L1,L3) and Follow(L3,L2) hold,
then MayFollow(L1,L2) is derived. Note that if MayFollow(L1,L2)
is not derived in the fixed-point (at the end of the fixed-point com-
putation), then the instruction at label L2 does not appear after the
instruction at label L1, in any execution of the contract.
The inference rules for MustFollow are defined similarly, with a
special attention to the join points in the CFG.
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Data-dependency may-analysis
MayDepOn(Y , X ) ⇐ assign(_, Y , X )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ assign(_, Y , X ), MayDepOn(X , T )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ op(_, Y , . . . , X , . . .), MayDepOn(X , T )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ mload(L, Y , O ), isConst(O ), MemTag(L, O, T )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ mload(L, Y , O ), ¬isConst(O ), MemTag(L, _, T )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ mload(L, Y , O ), MemTag(L, ⊤, T )
MayDepOn(Y , T ) ⇐ assign(L, Y , _), Taint(_, L, X ), MayDepOn(X , T )
Memory analysis inference
MemTag(L, O, T ) ⇐ mstore(L, O, X ), isConst(O ), MayDepOn(X , T )
MemTag(L, ⊤, T ) ⇐ mstore(L, O, X ), ¬isConst(O ), MayDepOn(X , T )
MemTag(L, O, T ) ⇐ Follow(L1, L), MemTag(L1, O, T ),
¬ReassignMem(L, O )
ReassignMem(L, O )⇐ mstore(L, O, _), isConst(O )
Implicit control-flow analysis
Taint(L1, L2, X ) ⇐ goto(L1, X , L2)
Taint(L1, L2, X ) ⇐ goto(L1, X , _), Follow(L1, L2)
Taint(L1, L2, X ) ⇐ Taint(L1, L3, X ), Follow(L3, L2), ¬Join(L1, L2)
Figure 8: Partial inference rules for MayDepOn: the Data-
log variable X ranges over contract variables, L ranges over
instruction labels, ⊤ represents an unknown offset, and T
ranges over tags.
Data-Dependency Predicates. The dependency predicates we
consider are MayDepOn, Eq, and DetBy. The intuitive meaning of
them (also summarized in Fig. 7) is:
– MayDepOn(Y ,T ) is derived if the value of variableY depends
on the tag T . Here, the variable T ranges over tags, which
can be a contract variable (e.g., x) or an instruction (e.g.,
timestamp). For example, MayDepOn(Y ,X ) means that the
value of variable Y may change if the value of X changes,
while MayDepOn(Y , timestamp) means that Y may change
if the instruction timestamp returns a different value.
– Eq(Y ,T ) indicates that the values of Y and T are identical.
For example, given fact assign(l ,x , caller), which stores the
sender’s address at variable x , we have Eq(x , caller).
– DetBy(Y ,T ) indicates that a different value of T guarantees
that the value of Y changes. For example, DetBy(x , caller)
is derived if we have the fact sha3(l , x, start, len), which
returns the hash of the memory segment starting at offset
start and ending at offset start + len, if any part of this
memory segment is determined by caller. Note that Eq(Y ,T )
implies that DetBy(Y ,T ) also holds.
The Datalog rules defining these data-dependency predicates
are given in Fig. 8. To avoid clutter in the rules, we use the wildcard
symbol (_) in place of variables that appear only once in the rule;
for example, we write MayDepOn(Y ,X ) ⇐ assign(_,Y ,X ) instead
ofMayDepOn(Y ,X ) ⇐ assign(L,Y ,X ). The rules rely on additional
predicates: isConst, MemTag (and, similarly, StorageTag, which are
omitted from Fig. 8) and Taint. We briefly explain the meaning of
these predicates and how they are derived below.
– The predicate isConst(O) holds if O is constant that appears
in the contract. For example, the fact isConst(0) is added to
the Datalog input derived for the contract in Fig. 5.
– The predicate MemTag(L,O,T ) (and similarly StorageTag)
defines that, at label L, the value at offset O in the mem-
ory (or storage) is assigned tag T . It is defined with three
rules. The first rule encodes that writing a variable X tagged
with T to a constant (i.e., known) offset O at label L, results
in tagging the memory offset O at label L with tag T . The
second rule defines the case when the offset is unknown, in
which case all possible offsets, captured via the constant ⊤,
are assigned tag T . The third rule propagates the tags to
the following instructions, until reaching to an instruction
that reassigns that memory location (captured by a predicate
ReassignMem).
– The predicate Taint(L1,L2,X ) encodes that the execution of
the instruction at label L2 depends on the value ofX , whereX
is the condition of a goto instruction at label L1. The first
two rules defining the predicate Taint(L1,L2,X ) taint the
two branches that originate at a goto instruction at label L1
with the condition X . Finally, the third rule propagates the
tag X along the instructions of the two branches until they
are merged.
MayDepOn(X ,T ) defines that variable X may have tag T . The
first rule defines that assigning a variable X to Y results in tagging
Y with X . The second rule propagates any tags of X to the assigned
variable Y . The third rule propagates tags over operations with
tagged variables. The three rules with mload instructions propagate
tags from memory to variables. The first mload rule defines that
when loading data from a constant offset O , the tags associated
to that offset are propagated to the output variable Y . The second
mload rules states that if the offset is unknown, then all tags of the
memory are propagated to the output variable Y . Finally, the third
mload rule propagates tags that are written to unknown offsets
(identified by ⊤). The final rule defines that if the execution of an
assign(L,Y , _) instruction depends on a variable X (i.e., the label L
is tainted with the variable X ), then all tags assigned to X are
propagated to the output variable Y .
We remark that the rules for inferring Eq and DetBy predicates
are defined in a similar way and are therefore omitted.
5 SECURITY PATTERNS
In this section, we show how to express security patterns over
semantics facts. We begin by defining the Securify language for
expressing security patterns. Then, to define security properties
formally, we provide background on the execution semantics of
EVM contracts and formally define properties. We continue by pre-
senting a set of relevant security properties, and for each, we show
compliance and violation patterns, which imply the property and,
respectively, its negation. This construction enables us to deter-
mine whether a contract complies with or violates a given security
property. Finally, we show how Securify leverages some patterns
for error-localization.
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5.1 Securify Language
We first define the syntax of the language for writing patterns and
then define how patterns are interpreted over the semantic facts
derived for a given contract (described in Section 4).
Syntax. The syntax of the Securify language is given by the
following BNF:
φ ::= instr(L,Y ,X , . . . ,X ) | Eq(X ,T ) | DetBy(X ,T )
| MayDepOn(X ,T ) | MayFollow(L,L) | MustFollow(L,L)
| Follow(L,L) | ∃X .φ | ∃L.φ | ∃T .φ | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ
Here, L, X , and T are variables that range over program elements
such as labels, contract variables, and tags. Patterns can refer to
instructions instr(L,Y ,X1, . . . ,Xn ), where instr is the instruction
name, L is the instruction’s label, Y is the variable storing the
instruction result (if any), and X1, . . . ,Xn are variables given to the
instruction as arguments (if any). Patterns can also refer to flow-
and data-dependency semantic facts, which can be used to impose
conditions on the labels and variables that appear in instructions.
Finally, the patterns can quantify over labels, variables, and tags
using the standard exists quantifier (∃). More complex patterns can
be written by composing simpler patterns with negation (¬) and
conjunction (∧).
We define several syntactic shorthands that simplify the specifi-
cation of patterns. We use standard logical equivalences: we write
∀X . φ(X ) for ¬(∃X . ¬φ(X )),φ1∨φ2 for ¬(¬φ1∧¬φ2), andφ1 ⇒ φ2
for ¬φ1 ∨ φ2. We also write X = T for Eq(X ,T ). For readability,
we write: some instr(X ). φ(Y ) for ∃X . instr(X ) ∧ φ(Y ), which im-
poses that there is some instruction instr(X ) for which the log-
ical condition φ(Y ) holds. Similarly, we write all instr(X ). φ(Y )
for ∀X . instr(X ) ⇒ φ(Y ), which imposes that for all instructions
instr(X ) the condition φ(Y ) must hold.
Semantics. Patterns are interpreted by checking the inferred se-
mantic facts:
– Quantifiers and connectors are interpreted as usual.
– Flow- and data-dependency predicates are interpreted as
defined in Section 4; i.e., a semantic fact holds if and only if
it is contained in the Datalog fixed-point.
For example, consider the pattern:
some sstore(L,X ,Y ). DetBy(X , caller)
which is a shorthand for ∃X . sstore(L,X ,Y )∧DetBy(X , caller). This
pattern is matched if there is an instruction sstore(L,X ,Y ) in the
contract such that the offsetX is determined by the address returned
by the caller instruction (captured by the predicateDetBy(X , caller)).
For brevity, we omit variables that are not conditioned in the pattern:
some sstore(_,X , _). DetBy(X , caller).
In Fig. 9, we list security patterns that are built-in in Securify.
In the following, we first give additional background on the EVM
execution model and then present these patterns.
5.2 EVM Background and Properties
To understand the security properties defined in the next section,
we extend the background on EVM (given in Section 4.1.1), which
focused on the EVM syntax, with the semantics of EVM contracts.
EVM Semantics. A contract is a sequence of EVM instructions
C = (c0, . . . , cm ). The semantics of a contract [[C]] is the set of all
traces from an initial state. A trace of a contract C is a sequence
of state-instruction pairs (σ0, c0) → . . . → (σk , ck ), from an initial
state σ0, and such that the relation (σj , c j ) → (σj+1, c j+1) is valid
according to the EVM execution semantics [52]. If a trace success-
fully terminates, then ck = ⊥. A state consists of the storage and
memory state (mentioned in Section 4.1.1), stack state, transaction
information, and block information. We denote by σS[i]/σM[i] the
value stored at offset i in the storage/memory, by σS/σM the state
of the storage/memory, by σBal the contract’s balance, by σT the
transaction, and by σB the block information. We denote by t[i] the
ith pair of the trace t , for a positive i . For a negative i , t[i] refers
to the ith − 1 pair of t from the end of the sequence. We denote by
σ t [i]/ct [i] the state/instruction of the ith pair of t , and by σ t [i]f the
value of instruction f (e.g., caller) in σ t [i].
Properties. A property is a relation over sets of traces. A contract
satisfies a security property ρ if [[C]] ∈ ρ. If [[C]] < ρ, we say that
C violates the property ρ. We define relations using first-order
logic formulas. The formulas are interpreted over the traces and
the bitstrings that comprise the user identifiers, offsets, and other
arguments or return values of the EVM instructions. We denote
by t1, t2, ... variables that refer to traces. We denote by i1, i2, ...
variables that refer to the index of a pair in a trace. We use other
letters for bitstring variables. For example, we use a to refer to a
bitstring which is used in the formula to refer to a user’s identifier
(her address), and we use x to refer to an offset in the storage or as
arguments to call. For simplicity’s sake, although EVM is a stack-
based language, we write instructions as r ← instr(a1, . . . ,ak ) and
use the wildcard for arguments/return values that are not important
to the formula. Note that a1, ...ak , r represent the concrete values
at the moment of execution.
5.3 Security Properties and Patterns
We now define seven security properties with respect to the EVM
semantics [52]. Checking these properties precisely is impossible
since EVM is Turing-complete. Instead, for each property, we define
compliance and violation patterns over our language, which over-
approximate the property and, respectively, its negation. That is, a
compliance pattern match implies that the property holds, and a
violation pattern match implies that the property’s negation holds.
If neither pattern is matched, then the property may or may not
hold. In the following, for each security property, we describe its
relevance, present its formal definition, and then refine it into a set
of compliance and violation patterns. The complete list of properties
and patterns is given in Fig. 9.
Ether Liquidity (LQ). In November 2017, a bug in a contract
led to freezing $160M [13]. The bug occurred because a contract
relied on another smart contract (acting as a library) to transfer
its ether to users. Unfortunately, a user accidentally removed the
library contract, freezing the contract’s ether. The combination of
the contract being able to receive ether from users and the absence
of an explicit transfer to the user led to this issue. Formally, we
define this security property by requiring that (i) all traces t do not
change the contract’s balance (which means that the contract has
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Property Type Security Pattern
LQ: Ether compliance all stop(L1). some goto(L2,X ,L3). X = callvalue ∧ Follow(L2,L4) ∧ L3 , L4 ∧MustFollow(L4,L1)
liquidity compliance some call(L1, _, _,Amount).Amount , 0 ∨ DetBy(Amount , data)
violation
(
some stop(L). ¬MayDepOn(L, callvalue)) ∧ (all call(_, _, _,Amount). Amount = 0)
NW: No writes compliance all call(L1, _, _, _). all sstore(L2, _, _). ¬MayFollow(L1,L2)
after call violation some call(L1, _, _, _). some sstore(L2, _, _). MustFollow(L1,L2)
RW: Restricted compliance all sstore(_,X , _). DetBy(X , caller)
write violation some sstore(L1,X , _). ¬MayDepOn(X , caller) ∧ ¬MayDepOn(L1, caller)
RT: Restricted compliance all call(_, _, _,Amount). Amount = 0
transfer violation some call(L1, _, _,Amount). DetBy(Amount , data) ∧ ¬MayDepOn(L1, caller) ∧ ¬MayDepOn(L1, data)
HE: Handled compliance all call(L1,Y , _, _). some goto(L2,X , _). MustFollow(L1,L2) ∧ DetBy(X ,Y )
exception violation some call(L1,Y , _, _). all goto(L2,X , _). MayFollow(L1,L2) ⇒ ¬MayDepOn(X ,Y )
TOD: Transaction compliance all call(_, _, _,Amount). ¬MayDepOn(Amount , sload) ∧ ¬MayDepOn(Amount , balance)
ordering violation some call(_, _, _,Amount). some sload(_,Y ,X ). some sstore(_,X , _). DetBy(Amount ,Y ) ∧ isConst(X )
dependency
VA: Validated compliance all sstore(L1, _,X ). MayDepOn(X , arg)
arguments ⇒ (some goto(L2,Y , _). MustFollow(L2,L1) ∧ DetBy(Y , arg))
violation some sstore(L1, _,X ). DetBy(X , arg)
⇒ ¬(some goto(L2,Y , _). MayFollow(L2,L1) ∧MayDepOn(Y , arg))
Figure 9: Compliance and violation security patterns for relevant security properties
no ether and thus its ether is vacuously liquid), or (ii) there exists a
trace t that decreases the contract’s balance (i.e., ether is liquid).
ψLQ = (∀t .σ t [0]Bal = σ
t [−1]
Bal ) ∨ (∃t .σ
t [0]
Bal > σ
t [−1]
Bal )
To over-approximateψLQ with our language, we leverage the fact
that if ether is transferred to the contract, then the amount of ether
transferred is given by the callvalue instruction. Thus, if, for all
traces that complete successfully, this amount is zero, then the
first part of ψLQ is satisfied. These is exactly the first liquidity
compliance pattern in Fig. 9: it matches if all transactions that
can complete successfully (reach a stop instruction) have to follow
a branch of a condition (where the condition is identified by a
goto instruction) that is reachable only if the ether transferred
to this contract is zero (this branch is the one to which the goto
instruction does not jump). The second liquidity compliance pattern
over-approximates the second part ofψLQ . It leverages the fact that
ether is liquid if there is a reachable call instruction which sends
a non-zero amount of ether. Concretely, it is matched if there is a
call instruction which transfers (i) a positive amount of ether or
(ii) amount of ether which depends only on the transaction data,
and thus can be positive.
Our violation pattern over-approximates ¬ψLQ by checking that
both conditions are false: the contract can receive ether, but cannot
transfer ether. To guarantee that the contract can receive ether, it
verifies that there is an execution that can complete successfully (i.e.,
reach stop) and its execution does not depend on callvalue – this
guarantees that some trace with positive callvalue can complete.
To guarantee that ether cannot be transferred, it verifies that all
call instructions transfer 0 ether.
NoWrites After Calls (NW). In July 2016, a bug in the DAO con-
tract enabled an attacker to steal $60M [1]. The attacker exploited
the combination of two factors. First, a call instruction which upon
its execution enabled the recipient of that call to execute her own
code before returning to the contract. Second, the amount trans-
ferred by this call depended on a storage value, which was updated
after this call. This value was critical as it recorded the amount
of ether that the call’s recipient had in the contract, and can thus
request to receive. This allowed the attacker to call the function
again before the storage was updated, thus making the contract be-
lieve that the user still had ether in the contract. A property that
captures when this attack cannot occur checks that there are no
writes to the storage after any call instruction. We formalize this
vulnerability by requiring that, for all traces t , the storage does not
change in the interval that starts just before any call instruction
and ends when the trace completes:
ψNW = ∀t∀i(i < −1 ∧ ct [i] = _← call(_, _, _)) ⇒ σ t [i]S = σ t [−1]S
Note that this property is different from reentrancy [39], which
stipulates that the callee must not be able to re-enter the same
function and reach the call instruction. Our compliance rule over-
approximatesψNW by leveraging the fact that the storage can only
be changed via sstore. It is thus matched if call instructions are
not followed by sstore instructions. Our violation pattern over-
approximates ¬ψNW by checking that there is a call instruction
which must be followed by a write to the storage, in which case the
implication ofψNW is violated.
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Restricted Writes (RW). In July 2017, an attacker stole $30M
because of an unrestricted write to the storage [10]. The attacker
exploited the reliance of the contract on a library that enabled to
unconditionally set an owner field to any address. This enabled the
attacker to take ownership over the contract and steal its ether. We
consider a security property that guarantees that writes to storage
are restricted. The property requires that, for every storage offset x
(e.g., a field in the contract), there is a user a that cannot write at
offset x of the storage.
ψRW = ∀x∃a∀t(σ t [0]caller = a ⇒ ct [−1] , sstore(_,x , _))
Our compliance pattern over-approximatesψRW by checking that
offsets of sstore instructions, denoted x , are determined by the
sender’s identifier (i.e., users can only write to their designated
slot). This ensures that for all x , there exists a user a (in fact, all
users but one) who cannot write to x . The violation pattern over-
approximates ¬φRW by checking if there is an sstore instruction
whose execution and offset are independent of caller. In this case,
we can define an offset x , for which all users can write – hence
violating the property. If this property is too restrictive (there are
cases where it is safe to allow global writes to the storage), one can
define it (and adapt the patterns) with respect to critical writes (e.g.,
writes that modify an owner field), identified by their label l .
In the following, we skip the formal definition of properties, and
only describe them informally.
Restricted Transfer (RT). We define a property that guarantees
that ether transfers (via call) cannot be invoked by any user a. Viola-
tion of this property can detect Ponzi schemes [20]. Our compliance
pattern requires that for all users, invocations of that call instruc-
tion do not transfer ether. Our first violation pattern checks if the
call instruction transfers non-zero amount of ether and its execu-
tion is independent of the sender. For the second violation pattern,
the amount of ether transferred depends on the transaction data
(and thus can be set to a non-zero value), while the execution is
independent of this data (and will thus take place).
Handled Exception (HE). In February 2016, a contract by the
name “King of Ether” had an issue due to mishandled exceptions,
forcing its creator to publicly ask users not to send ether to it [4].
The issue was that the return value of a call, which indicated if the
instruction completed successfully, was not checked.
Our compliance pattern checks that call instructions are followed
by a goto instruction whose condition is determined by the return
code of call. This guarantees that depending on the return code,
different execution paths are taken. Our violation pattern checks
that the call instruction is not followed by a goto instruction which
may depend on the return value. This guarantees that there is no
different behavior depending on the result of the call.
Transaction Ordering Dependency (TOD). An inherent issue
in the blockchain model is that there is no guarantee on the execu-
tion order of transactions. While this has been known, it recently
became critical in the context of Initial Coin Offerings, a popular
means for start-ups to collect money by selling tokens. The initial
tokens are sold at a low price while offering a high bonus, and as
demand increases the price increases and the bonus decreases. It has
been observed that miners exploit this to create their transactions
to win the big bonus at a low rate [14].
Our compliance pattern requires that the amount of ether send
by a call instruction is independent of the state of the storage and
contract’s balance. This means that reordering transactions (which
can be affected by changing the storage or balance) does not affect
the amount sent by the call execution. Our violation pattern checks
that the amount of the call instruction is determined by a value
read from the storage, whose offset in the storage is known (i.e., it
is constant), and that this value can be updated.
In Section 7, we evaluate several versions of the TOD property:
(i) TOD Transfer (TT) indicates that the execution of the ether trans-
fer depends on transaction ordering (e.g., a condition guarding the
transfer depends on the transaction ordering); (ii) TOD Amount
(TA) marks that the amount of ether transferred depends on the
transaction ordering (this variation is the one described above and
in Fig. 9); (iii) TOD Receiver (TR) captures the vulnerability that
the recipient of the ether transfer might change, depending on the
transaction ordering.
Validated Arguments (VA). Method arguments should be val-
idated before usage, because unexpected arguments may result
in insecure contract behaviors. Contracts must check whether all
transaction arguments meet their desired preconditions.
Our compliance pattern checks that before storing in the persis-
tent memory a variable that may depend on a method argument,
there exists a check of the argument value. Our violation pattern
identifies sstore instructions that write to memory a method argu-
ment without previously checking its value.
Limitations. We next discuss a few limitations of checking prop-
erties through patterns. First, all our violation patterns assume that
the violating instructions (which match the violation pattern) are
part of some terminating execution. For example, in the violation
pattern of ether liquidity, the matching stop is assumed to be reach-
able, and in the violation pattern of no writes after calls, both the
call and the write are assumed to be part of some terminating exe-
cution. We take this assumption since, in general, this problem is
undecidable.
Second, the security properties we consider are generic and
do not capture contract-specific requirements (we illustrate the
specification of contract-specific patterns in Securify’s DSL below).
Some vulnerabilities are, however, contract-specific, and therefore
they are not captured by our compliance patterns (i.e., a contract can
be exploitable even if a compliance pattern is matched). For example,
our compliance pattern for handled exceptions matches if there is
some check over the call’s return value. However, the pattern cannot
check that the exception was handled correctly, as this is contract-
specific. Similarly, the compliance pattern for validated arguments
matches if there is some check over the arguments. However, the
check can still miss cases where inputs are not correctly validated,
as the meaning of correctly validated varies across contracts.
Third, since our patterns do not capture precisely their corre-
sponding properties, it can happen that a contract matches neither
the compliance nor the violation pattern. In this case, Securify
cannot infer whether the property holds, and thus shows a warning.
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Contract-specific Patterns. Finally, we remark that Securify
is not limited to checking the security properties described above.
In fact, it is common that a security auditor would write custom
patterns defined for a particular contract. Such custom patterns are
specified by providing an expression in the Securify language.
To illustrate this, suppose an auditor wants to check whether the
execution of a specific sensitive call instruction at label l depends
on the address of the owner. To discover violations of this property,
the auditor would write:
some call(L, _, _, _).
(L = l) ∧ ¬(some sload(_,Owner ,X ). MayDepOn(L,X ))
Here,Owner is the identifier of the field storing the owner address,
i.e. a constant offset in the contract’s storage.
5.4 Error Localization via Violation Patterns
An important part of Securify is to pinpoint the instructions that
lead to violations (or potential violations) of security properties, as
this enables developers to fix the code. In this section, we charac-
terize which patterns enable such error localization. We call such
patterns instruction patterns (as they pinpoint instructions), and we
call other patterns contract pattern (as the violation is identified for
the entire contract).
Instruction Patterns. An instruction pattern has the
form of: some instr(X ). φv (X ), for violation patterns, and,
all instr(X ). φc (X ), for compliance patterns. That is, if a violation
pattern is an instruction pattern and it is matched by some
instr(X ), then Securify can highlight this instruction as a violation.
Similarly, if a compliance pattern is an instruction pattern and it is
not matched because of some instr(X ), then Securify can highlight
this instruction as a warning (assuming that the corresponding
violation pattern has not matched). Note that six of the violation
patterns in Fig. 9 (all except the violation pattern for ether liquidity)
are instruction patterns.
Contract Patterns. Patterns which are not instruction patterns
are called contract patterns. For them, it is difficult to pinpoint a
single instruction responsible for its violation. The ether liquidity
violation pattern is an example of a contract pattern: it conjoins
two different conditions pertaining to stop and call instructions. For
contract patterns, Securify evaluates the compliance and violation
patterns and flags the contract as vulnerable (if the violation pattern
is matched) or issues a warning (if no pattern is match) without
pinpointing specific instructions.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we detail the implementation of Securify.
Decompiler. The decompiler transforms the EVM bytecode pro-
vided as input into the corresponding assembly instructions, as
defined in [52]. Next, it converts the EVM instructions into an SSA
form. The SSA instructions are identical to the EVM instruction set
except that they exclude stack operations (e.g., pop, push, etc.). Our
conversion method is similar to the one described in [45, 51]. The
decompiler constructs the control flow graph (CFG) on top of the
decompiled instructions.
EVM dataset Solidity dataset
# Contracts 24, 594 100
# call instructions 46, 106 67
# sstore instructions 56, 346 297
Figure 10: Statistics of the two Ethereum datasets
Optimizations. Securify employs three optimizations over the
CFG, which improve the precision of its analysis:
(i) Unused instructions, which eliminates any instructions whose
results are not used. On average, this optimization reduces
the contract’s instructions by 44% and improves the scalabil-
ity and precision of the subsequent analysis.
(ii) Partial evaluation, which propagates constant values along
computations [29]. This step improves the precision of stor-
age and memory analysis (e.g., MemTag). As we show in our
evaluation, partial evaluation resolves over 70% of the offsets
that appear in storage/memory instructions.
(iii) Method inlining, which improves the precision of the static
analysis by making it context sensitive.
Inference of Semantic Facts. Securify derives semantic facts
using inference rules specified in stratified Datalog, using the Souf-
fle Datalog solver [36] to efficiently compute a fixed-point of all
facts. We report on concrete numbers in Section 7.
Evaluating Patterns. To check the security patterns, Securify
iterates over the instructions to handle the all and some quantifiers
in the patterns. Then, to check inferred facts, it directly queries the
fixed-point computed by the Datalog solver. If a violation pattern
is matched, Securify reports which instructions are identified as
vulnerable, to provide error-localization for users. If no pattern is
matched, Securify reports a warning, to indicate that an instruction
may or may not be vulnerable.
7 EVALUATION
To evaluate Securify, we conducted the following experiments:
(i) evaluated Securify’s effectiveness in proving the correctness
of and discovering violations in real-world contracts; (ii) manually
inspected Securify’s results (i.e., reported violations and warnings)
on smart contracts whose source code had been uploaded to Se-
curify’s public interface; (iii) compared Securify to Oyente [39]
and Mythril [16], two smart contract checkers based on symbolic
execution; (iv) measured the success of Securify’s decompiler in
resolving memory and storage offsets; (v) measured Securify’s
time and memory consumption.
Datasets. We used two datasets of smart contracts to evaluate
Securify. Our first dataset, dubbed EVM dataset, consists of 24, 594
smart contracts obtained by parsing create transactions using the
parity client [12]. Using create transactions, we obtained the EVM
bytecode of these smart contracts. Our second dataset, dubbed
Solidity dataset, consists of 100 smart contracts written in Solidity
which were uploaded to Securify’s public interface. To avoid bias,
we selected the first 100 contracts in alphabetical order uploaded
in 2018. To simplify manual inspection, we restricted our selection
to contracts with up to 200 lines of Solidity code.
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Figure 11: Securify results on the EVM dataset. The vio-
lations and compliance segments indicate instructions that
are proved to be safe/violations for each security property.
We give relevant statistics on the two datasets in Fig. 10. Note
that the number of contracts defines the relevant checks for the
ether liquidity (LQ) property, the number of sstore instructions
defines the relevant instructions for the restricted writes (RW) and
the validated arguments (VA) property, and the number of call
instructions defines the relevant instructions for the remaining
properties.
Security Analysis of Real-World Smart Contracts. In this
task, we evaluate Securify’s effectiveness in proving security prop-
erties (i.e., matching a compliance pattern) and finding violations
(i.e., matching a violation pattern) in real-world contracts. To this
end, we ran Securify on all smart contracts contained in our EVM
dataset and measured the fraction of violations, warnings, and
compliances reported by Securify.
Fig. 11 summarizes the results. The figure shows one bar for
each security property. Each bar has three segments: (i) violations,
which shows the fraction of instructions that have matched a vi-
olation pattern of the given property, (ii) warnings, which shows
the fraction of instructions that have not matched any pattern (nei-
ther violation or compliance pattern) of the given property, and
(iii) compliance, which shows the fraction of instructions that have
matched a compliance pattern of the given property. We note that
the sum of the three segments adds up to 100%.
For example, consider the no writes after calls (NW) property.
The data shows that 6.5% of the call instructions violate the property,
90.9% are proved to be compliant, and the remaining 2.6% are
reported as warnings. On average across all security properties,
Securify successfully proves that 55.5% of the relevant instructions
are safe, 29.3% are definite violations, and it reports 15.2%warnings.
Further, 65.9% of all instructions that failed to match a compliance
pattern (and hence may indicate an error) are successfully proved to
be definite violations (using the violation patterns). This indicates
a reduction of 65.9% in the number of instructions that users must
manually classify into true warnings and false warnings. We report
on the precise breakdown between false and true warnings in our
next experiment.
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Figure 12: Securify results on the Solidity dataset. The
warnings are classified into true and false warnings based
on whether they indicate a security issue or not.
Overall, our results indicate that Securify’s compliance and
violations patterns are expressive enough to prove and, respectively,
disprove relevant security properties. Further, we note that since
Securify is extensible, one can further refine Securify’s results
by extending it with additional patterns that would convert more
warnings into violations and compliances. This would benefit some
of the security properties that are harder to prove or disprove (such
as restricted writes).
Manual Inspection of Results. In our second experiment, we
manually inspected Securify’s reports to gain a better understand-
ing of its results. To this end, we ran Securify on all contracts
contained in our Solidity dataset. We then manually classified each
reported warning as a true warning if it indicates a violation of the
security property, and otherwise, we classified it as a false warning.
We also inspected and confirmed the correctness of all reported
violations and compliances.
Fig. 12 summarizes our results. As before, the figure shows one
bar for each security property. In addition to the violation and com-
pliance segments, we partition the segment with reported warnings
into true warnings and false warnings.
Consider the handled exception (HE) property. The data shows
that Securify successfully proves that 29.9% of the call instructions
have return values that are not checked by the code (indicating
a violation of the property). Further, Securify proves that these
error values are checked for the remaining 70.1% of call instructions.
Securify does not issue any warnings for this property because it
matched at least on of the patterns for each of the call instructions.
We remark that the number of security issues discovered in the
Solidity dataset is higher relative to those found in the EVM dataset.
We believe this is due to the fact that the two datasets come from dif-
ferent distributions: the Solidity dataset consists of recent contracts
(uploaded in 2018) that are still in development stage. In contrast,
the EVM dataset contains all contracts deployed on the blockchain.
Further, users often deliberately uploaded vulnerable contracts to
experiment and evaluate Securify. An exception is the reduction
in handled exception property (HE), which has more violations in
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Figure 13: Comparing Securify to Oyente and Mythril
the EVM dataset compared to the Solidity dataset. We believe this
is due to the fact that developers now use the transfer() state-
ment for ether transfers, which handles errors by default and was
specifically introduced to avoid issues due unhandled exceptions.
We observe that the effectiveness of the patterns varies across
properties, which is expected as some properties are more difficult
to prove/disprove than others. For example, the restricted trans-
fer property (RT) and the three transaction ordering dependence
properties (TT, TR, and TA) are hard to prove correct and result
in a relatively high number of false warnings (roughly half of the
warnings are false warnings). However, for other security proper-
ties, such as no writes after calls (NW) and handled exception (HE),
all warnings issued by Securify indicate true warnings, indicat-
ing that the corresponding compliance patterns precisely matches
contracts that satisfy these properties.
Comparing Securify to Symbolic Security Checkers. We
now compare Securify to two recent open-source security check-
ers based on symbolic execution – Oyente [39] and Mythril [16].
To compare the three systems, we ran the latest versions of Oyente
and Mythril against all contracts in our Solidity dataset, for which
we have already manually classified all warnings into true and false
warnings. Oyente supports three of Securify’s security properties:
TOD, which checks the disjunction of the TOD receiver and TOD
amount properties, reentrancy (called no writes after calls1 in Secu-
rify), and handled exceptions. Mythril also supports the reentrancy
and handled exception properties, and in addition, implements a
check of the restricted transfer property.
Our results are summarized in Fig. 13. For Securify, we report
the fraction of reported violations, true warnings, and false warn-
ings. Since both Oyente and Mythril may report false positives
(Oyente has false positives because their checks do not imply a
contract vulnerability, as shown in [30]), we treat all bugs listed by
them as warnings as they must be classified by the user into true
warnings and false warnings. Note that, unlike Securify, Oyente
and Mythril do not report definite violations, i.e., results that are
guaranteed to violate security properties. Since Oyente and Mythril
1We remark that to ensure the absence of storage writes after call instructions, Oyente
checks that the user cannot re-enter and reach the same call instruction.
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Figure 14: Offsets resolved by partial evaluation.
explore a subset of all contract’s behaviors, they may fail to report
certain vulnerabilities, and we report these as unreported vulnera-
bilities in the figure. We depict true warnings and violations above
the X -axis (to indicate desirable results), and we plot false warn-
ings and unreported vulnerabilities below the X -axis (to indicate
undesirable results).
We observe that for all properties except reentrancy, Oyente and
Mythril miss to report some actual vulnerabilities. Oyente fails to
report 72.9% of TOD violations, and Mythril fails to report 65.6% of
the restricted transfer violations. Overall, the two symbolic tools
fail to report vulnerabilities for all considered security properties.
Resolving Storage/Memory Offsets. We report on Securify’s
partial evaluation optimization for resolving memory and storage
offsets. Fig. 14 shows the total number of mload, mstore, sload and
sstore instructions found in our EVM dataset. The figure depicts
the number of resolved offsets. On average across all four instruc-
tions, partial evaluation correctly resolves 72.6% of the offsets. This
indicates that Securify can often infer the precise writes to stor-
age/memory, thereby improving the precision of the subsequent
analysis. Memory offsets are more often resolved than storage off-
sets, as the latter often depend on user-provided inputs.
Time and Memory Consumption. Securify terminates for all
contracts and takes on average 30 seconds per contract (to check
all compliance and violation patterns). Oyente and Mythril have
similar running times when usedwith default settings (which do not
provide full coverage). To improve the coverage of these tools, users
must increase the constraint solving timeouts and loop bounds,
which in turn result in increased running times (especially for larger
contracts). The memory consumption of Securify is determined by
the size of the fixed point analysis. In 95% of cases, the consumption
was below 10MB, and in the rest it was below 1GB.
Summary. Overall, our results indicate that Securify’s patterns
are effective in finding violation and establishing correctness of
contracts. Going further, we see two relevant items for future work.
First, it would be interesting to integrate Securify with existing
frameworks that provide formal EVM semantics, such as [30, 32], as
a way to further validate Securify’s analysis and patterns, and to
formally prove the guarantees it provides. Second, we can leverage
Securify to improve existing symbolic checkers, such as Oyente
and Mythril. For example, Securify’s compliance patterns can be
used to reduce the false positive rate of these tools.
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8 RELATEDWORK
We discuss some of the works that are most closely related to ours.
Analysis of Smart Contracts. Smart contracts have been shown
to be exposed to severe vulnerabilities [19, 25]. Hirai [33] was one of
the firsts to formally verify smart contracts using the Isabelle proof
assistant. In [34], Hirai defines a formal model for the Ethereum
Virtual Machine using the Lem language. This model proves safety
properties of smart contracts using existing interactive theorem
provers. Formal semantics of the EVM have been defined by Gr-
ishchenko et al. [30] using the F* framework and by Hildenbrandt et
al. [32] using the K framework [46]. These semantics are executable
and were validated against the official Ethereum test suite. Further,
they enable the formal specification and verification of properties.
The main benefit of these frameworks is that they provide strong
formal verification guarantees and are precise (no false positives).
They target arbitrary properties, but are, unfortunately, nontrivial
to fully automate. In contrast, Securify targets properties that can
be proved/disproved by checking simpler properties that can be
verified in a fully automated way.
In the space of automated security tools for smart contracts,
there are several popular systems based on symbolic execution.
Examples include Oyente [39], Mythril [16], and Maian [44]. While
symbolic execution is indeed a powerful generic technique for dis-
covering bugs, it does not guarantee to explore all program paths
(resulting in false negatives). In contrast to these tools, Securify
explores all contract behaviors. In the context of smart contracts,
path constraints often involve hard-to-solve constraints, such as
hash-functions, resulting in low coverage or false positives. Further,
to avoid false positives, symbolic tools must precisely explore the
set of feasible contract blocks. Towards this, Maian already uses
a concrete validation step to filter false positives. An interesting
application of Securify would be to filter the false positives re-
ported by symbolic tools using its compliance patterns. In contrast
to the approaches based on symbolic execution, Securify is an
abstract interpreter. As such, it can provide soundness guarantees
over all possible executions. This is different from symbolic execu-
tion which can only guarantee soundness if the number of paths
can be bounded (in particular, this means that loops have to be
unrolled). Even when the number of paths is bound, an abstract
interpreter often scales better than symbolic execution since it can
join paths and does not have to explore different paths separately.
On the other hand, symbolic execution can, in principle, handle
more expressive predicates (within the logic of the underlying SMT
solver), and, in theory, it has no false positives (in practice, as we
show in Fig. 13, it can have false positives).
Bhargavan et al. [21] present preliminary work on verifying
Ethereum smart contracts by translating Solidity and EVM bytecode
to an existing verification system. The paper does not report how
their tool performs on real-world contracts. The work presented
in [22] combines game theory and probabilistic model checking to
validate a decentralized smart contract protocol.
The Zeus system [37] is a sound analyzer that translates smart
contracts to the LLVM framework. Zeus uses XACML as a language
to write properties. In contrast, Securify’s DSL supports the check-
ing of data- and control-flow properties. Further, Zeus does not
support violation patterns as a way to reduce false positives. We
could not directly compare Securify with Zeus as neither Zeus nor
its benchmarks are publicly available.
Similarly to Securify, the work by Grossman et al. [31] also
targets domains-specific properties. In more detail, they introduce
a dynamic linearizability checker to identify reentrancy issues. In
contrast, Securify supports a larger class of properties for smart
contracts and supports a DSL to allow security experts to extend
the system with more properties.
Security Factors. Delmolino et al. [28] document the kinds of
vulnerabilities students introduce while writing smart contracts
and propose methods on how to avoid common pitfalls. Chen et
al. [27] show that the current standard compiler Solidity does not
properly optimize the EVM bytecode. Seijas et al. [47] overview
the capabilities of different blockchains such as Bitcoin, Nxt, and
Ethereum, and survey extensions (Kosba et al. [38]).
Language-Based Security. Programming language approaches
enforce security at the program code level. PQL [42] introduces
a program query language for Java that allows developers to ex-
press patterns of interest and check Java programs against them.
Both [42] and our work have an underlying declarative solver for
the static analysis. Pidgin [35] is a custom query language for pro-
gram dependence graphs that can also capture security properties
on Java programs. In contrast, our work focuses on Ethereum smart
contracts. Securify’s analysis is tailored to the Ethereum setting,
such as Ethereum-specific instructions (e.g., balance) and reason-
ing across memory and contract storage. Furthermore, Securify
provides a DSL specific to security properties for smart contracts.
Declarative Program Analysis. Declarative approaches to pro-
gram analysis are related to Securify’s fact inference engine, as
they also rely on Datalog to express analysis computations. The
Doop framework [23, 49] presents a fast and scalable declarative
points-to analysis for Java programs and is one of the first works
to show the promise of declarative static analysis. Following these
ideas, the authors of [53] present a technique for automatic abstrac-
tion refinement for static analysis specified in Datalog, and in [41]
the authors propose to involve the developer in the abstraction-
refinement loop. Researchers have developed specific extensions to
Datalog, such as Flix [40], to improve the efficiency and scalability
of Datalog-based program analysis. These works are orthogonal
to Securify’s inference engine. They develop general program
analysis techniques, while Securify leverages these advances for
reasoning about smart contracts. As such, Securify can benefit
from any future advances in Datalog-based program analysis.
9 CONCLUSION
We presented Securify, a new lightweight and scalable verifier for
Ethereum smart contracts. Securify leverages the domain-specific
insight that violations of many practical properties for smart con-
tracts also violate simpler properties, which are significantly easier
to check in a purely automated way. Based on this insight, we de-
vised compliance and violation patterns that can effectively prove
whether real-world contracts are safe/unsafe with respect to rele-
vant properties. Overall, Securify enjoys several important benefits:
(i) it analyzes all contract behaviors to avoid undesirable false nega-
tives; (ii) it reduces the user effort in classifying warnings into true
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positives and false alarms by guaranteeing that certain behaviors
are actual errors; (iii) it supports a new domain-specific language
that enables users to express new vulnerability patterns as they
emerge; finally, (iv) its analysis pipeline – from bytecode decompi-
lation, optimizations, to checking of patterns – is fully automated
using scalable, off-the-shelf Datalog solvers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research leading to these results was partially supported by
an ERC Starting Grant 680358. We thank Hubert Ritzdorf and the
ChainSecurity team for their valuable contributions to this project.
REFERENCES
[1] 2016. The DAO Attacked: Code Issue Leads to 60 Million Ether Theft. (2016).
[2] 2016. Etherdice. (2016). Available from: https://etherdice.io/.
[3] 2016. King of Ether. (2016). Available from: https://github.com/kieranelby/
KingOfTheEtherThrone/blob/v0.4.0/contracts/KingOfTheEtherThrone.sol.
[4] 2016. King of Ether, Postmortem. (2016). Available from: https://www.
kingoftheether.com/postmortem.html.
[5] 2016. Reentrancy Woes in Smart Contracts. (2016). Available from: http:
//hackingdistributed.com/2016/07/13/reentrancy-woes/.
[6] 2016. theDAO. (2016). Available from: https://etherscan.io/address/
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413.
[7] 2017. Accidental bug may have frozen $280 million worth of digital coin ether in
a cryptocurrency wallet. (2017). Available from: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/
08/accidental-bug-may-have-frozen...
[8] 2017. Blockchain is empowering the future of insurance.
(2017). Available from: https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/29/
blockchain-is-empowering-the-future-of-insurance/.
[9] 2017. ETHLance. (2017). Available from: http://ethlance.com/.
[10] 2017. An In-Depth Look at the Parity Multisig Bug. (2017). Available from:
http://hackxingdistributed.com/2017/07/22/deep-dive-parity-bug.
[11] 2017. Northern Trust uses blockchain for private equity record-
keeping. (2017). Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/
nthern-trust-ibm-blockchain-idUSL1N1G61TX.
[12] 2017. Parity Ethereum Client. (2017). Available from: https://github.com/
paritytech/parity.
[13] 2017. Security Alert. (2017). Available from: https://paritytech.io/blog/
security-alert.html.
[14] 2017. Submarine Sends: IC3’s Plan to Clamp Down on ICO
Cheats. (2017). Available from: https://www.coindesk.com/
submarine-sends-inside-ic3s-plan-to-clamp-...
[15] 2018. Ethereum Smart Contract Security Best Practices. (2018). Available from:
https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/.
[16] 2018. Mythril. (2018). Available from: https://github.com/ConsenSys/mythril.
[17] 2018. Parity Wallet Library. (2018). Available from: https://github.com/
paritytech/parity/blob/4d08e7b0aec46443bf26547b17d10cb302672835/js/src/
contracts/snippets/enhanced-wallet.sol.
[18] 2018. Solidity, high-level language for writing smart contracts. (2018). Available
from: https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/.
[19] Nicola Atzei, Massimo Bartoletti, and Tiziana Cimoli. 2017. A Survey of Attacks
on Ethereum Smart Contracts (SoK). In Principles of Security and Trust - 6th
International Conference, POST. 164–186.
[20] Massimo Bartoletti, Salvatore Carta, Tiziana Cimoli, and Roberto Saia. 2017.
Dissecting Ponzi schemes on Ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact.
CoRR abs/1703.03779 (2017).
[21] Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Anitha Gol-
lamudi, Georges Gonthier, Nadim Kobeissi, Natalia Kulatova, Aseem Rastogi,
Thomas Sibut-Pinote, Nikhil Swamy, and Santiago Zanella-Béguelin. 2016. For-
mal Verification of Smart Contracts: Short Paper. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS). 91–96.
[22] Giancarlo Bigi, Andrea Bracciali, Giovanni Meacci, and Emilio Tuosto. 2015.
Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal
Methods. In Programming Languages with Applications to Biology and Security.
142–161.
[23] Martin Bravenboer and Yannis Smaragdakis. 2009. Strictly Declarative Specifica-
tion of Sophisticated Points-to Analyses. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual ACM
SIGPLAN Conference on Object-Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and
Applications (OOPSLA). 243–262.
[24] Vitalik Buterin. 2013. Ethereum: a next generation smart contract and decentral-
ized application platform. (2013). Available from: https://github.com/ethereum/
wiki/wiki/White-Paper.
[25] Vitalik Buterin. 2016. Thinking About Smart Contract Security. (2016). Available
from: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/19/thinking-smart-contract-security/.
[26] Pawel Bylica. 2017. How to Find $10M Just by Reading the
Blockchain. (Apr 2017). Available from: https://blog.golemproject.net/
how-to-find-10m-by-just-reading-blockchain-6ae9d39fcd95.
[27] Ting Chen, Xiaoqi Li, Xiapu Luo, and Xiaosong Zhang. 2017. Under-optimized
smart contracts devour your money. In Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengi-
neering (SANER). 442–446.
[28] Kevin Delmolino, Mitchell Arnett, Ahmed Kosba, Andrew Miller, and Elaine Shi.
2016. Step by Step Towards Creating a Safe Smart Contract: Lessons and Insights
from a Cryptocurrency Lab. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC).
79–94.
[29] Yoshihiko Futamura. 1999. Partial Evaluation of Computation Process - An
Approach to a Compiler-Compiler. Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation 12, 4
(1999), 381–391.
[30] Ilya Grishchenko, Matteo Maffei, and Clara Schneidewind. 2018. A Semantic
Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts. In Principles
of Security and Trust - 7th International Conference (POST). 243–269.
[31] Shelly Grossman, Ittai Abraham, Guy Golan-Gueta, Yan Michalevsky, Noam
Rinetzky, Mooly Sagiv, and Yoni Zohar. 2018. Online detection of effectively
callback free objects with applications to smart contracts. PACMPL 2, POPL
(2018), 48:1–48:28.
[32] Everett Hildenbrandt, Manasvi Saxena, Nishant Rodrigues, Xiaoran Zhu, Philip
Daian, Dwight Guth, Brandon M. Moore, Daejun Park, Yi Zhang, Andrei Ste-
fanescu, and Grigore Rosu. 2018. KEVM: A Complete Formal Semantics of the
Ethereum Virtual Machine. In 31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Sympo-
sium (CSF). 204–217.
[33] Yoichi Hirai. 2016. Formal verification of Deed contract in Ethereum name service.
Technical Report. Available from: https://yoichihirai.com/deed.pdf.
[34] Yoichi Hirai. 2017. Defining the Ethereum Virtual Machine for Interactive Theo-
rem Provers. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 520–535.
[35] Andrew Johnson, Lucas Waye, Scott Moore, and Stephen Chong. 2015. Exploring
and Enforcing Security Guarantees via Program Dependence Graphs. In Proceed-
ings of the 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI). 291–302.
[36] Herbert Jordan, Bernhard Scholz, and Pavle Subotic. 2016. Soufflé: On Synthesis of
Program Analyzers. In Computer Aided Verification - 28th International Conference
(CAV). 422–430.
[37] Sukrit Kalra, Seep Goel, Mohan Dhawan, and Subodh Sharma. 2018. ZEUS:
Analyzing Safety of Smart Contracts. In 25th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS).
[38] Ahmed E. Kosba, Andrew Miller, Elaine Shi, Zikai Wen, and Charalampos Pa-
pamanthou. 2016. Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-
Preserving Smart Contracts. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
839–858.
[39] Loi Luu, Duc-Hiep Chu, Hrishi Olickel, Prateek Saxena, and Aquinas Hobor.
2016. Making Smart Contracts Smarter. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 254–269.
[40] Magnus Madsen, Ming-Ho Yee, and Ondrej Lhoták. 2016. From Datalog to flix:
a declarative language for fixed points on lattices. In Proceedings of the 37th
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
(PLDI). 194–208.
[41] Ravi Mangal, Xin Zhang, Aditya V. Nori, and Mayur Naik. 2015. A user-guided
approach to program analysis. In Proceedings of the 2015 10th Joint Meeting on
Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE). 462–473.
[42] Michael C. Martin, V. Benjamin Livshits, and Monica S. Lam. 2005. Finding
application errors and security flaws using PQL: a program query language. In
Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Object-Oriented
Programming, Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA). 365–383.
[43] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2008. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. (2008).
[44] Ivica Nikolic, Aashish Kolluri, Ilya Sergey, Prateek Saxena, and Aquinas Hobor.
2018. Finding The Greedy, Prodigal, and Suicidal Contracts at Scale. CoRR
abs/1802.06038 (2018).
[45] Todd A. Proebsting and Scott A.Watterson. 1997. Krakatoa: Decompilation in Java
(Does Bytecode Reveal Source?). In Third USENIX Conference on Object-Oriented
Technologies and Systems (COOTS). 185–198.
[46] Grigore Roşu and Traian Florin Şerbănuţă. 2010. An Overview of the K Semantic
Framework. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 79, 6 (2010), 397–434.
[47] Pablo Lamela Seijas, Simon Thompson, and Darryl McAdams. 2016. Scripting
smart contracts for distributed ledger technology. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
2016 (2016).
[48] Gagandeep Singh, Markus Püschel, and Martin Vechev. 2017. Fast Polyhedra Ab-
stract Domain. In Proceedings of the 44th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles
of Programming Languages (POPL). 46–59.
[49] Yannis Smaragdakis andMartin Bravenboer. 2010. UsingDatalog for Fast and Easy
Program Analysis. In Datalog Reloaded - First International Workshop, Datalog.
245–251.
15
[50] Jeffrey D. Ullman. 1988. Principles of Database and Knowledge-base Systems, Vol. I.
Principles of computer science series, Vol. 14.
[51] Raja Vallee-Rai and Laurie J. Hendren. 1998. Jimple: Simplifying Java Bytecode
for Analyses and Transformations. (1998).
[52] Gavin Wood. 2014. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger. Ethereum Project Yellow Paper (2014).
[53] Xin Zhang, Ravi Mangal, Radu Grigore, Mayur Naik, and Hongseok Yang. 2014.
On abstraction refinement for program analyses in Datalog. In ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, (PLDI). 239–
248.
16
